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Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) has been un-
der criticism for decades for not taking account of preference intensities.
Computer-simulation results by Aki Lehtinen concerning strategic voting
under various voting rules show that this intensity argument does not need
to rest on mere intuition. Voters may express intensities by voting strate-
gically, and that this has bene…cial aggregate-level consequences: utilitar-
ian e¢ciency is higher if voters engage in strategic behaviour than if they
always vote sincerely. Strategic voting is thus unambiguously bene…cial
under a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes. What has been considered the
main argument for IIA turns out to be one against it. This paper assesses
the implications of these results for interpretations of Arrow’s theorem and
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in a discussion on the methodological
and philosophical arguments concerning preference intensities and IIA.
(JEL classi…cation numbers: D71, D81)
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proofness
1 Introduction
The normative and descriptive relevance of preference intensities and the nor-
mative validity of Arrow’s (1963) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
have been under debate for decades in social choice theory. It has been argued
since its inception that IIA does not take preference intensities into account.
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A choice-theoretical de…nition of IIA is as follows. Let p and p0 denote
pro…les of individual preferences: p assigns a preference ordering Â? for each
voter ? 2 ? : p = (Â1?Â2? ????Â? )? Let pj? denote the restriction of the pro…le
p to the subset ? of ?. Let ?(Â? ?) denote the social choice from pro…le p on
??
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If for all ?? ? 2 ? and all individuals,
pjf???g = p0jf???g ! ?(Â? ?) = ?(Â0? ?)? (1)
In other words, if the two pro…les p and p0 rank each pair of alternatives in the
same way, then the social choice from the two pro…les should be the same.
Donald Saari (1998, 2001, 2003a) has recently argued that IIA is not norma-
tively acceptable because voting rules that satisfy this condition fail to respect
the rationality of voters. His proposal is to replace it with a condition called
binary intensity IIA (see also Saari 1995). This requires that the aggregate
ranking of each pair of alternatives is to be determined by each voter’s relative
ranking of that pair, and by the intensity of this ranking. The latter is deter-
mined by how many other alternatives are ranked between them. Saari argues
that the Borda count (BC) satis…es this condition, and respects the rationality
of voters by asking them to report a full preference ordering. Naturally, the BC
does not satisfy IIA. Those who have not been willing to abandon IIA tend to
emphasise its close link with strategic voting.1 The BC is commonly considered
to be highly manipulable.2
If there remain proponents of IIA, and if they view the debate related to it
as an inevitable trade-o¤ between rationality and intensities on the one hand,
and susceptibility to strategic manipulation on the other, they have embarked
on an enterprise that is doomed to failure. The simulation results in Lehtinen
(2006, forthcoming, 2007) suggest that utilitarian e¢ciency (the frequency with
which the alternative with the highest sum of utility is selected) is higher if voters
engage in strategic behaviour than if they always vote sincerely. Strategic voting
is thus unambiguously bene…cial under a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes.
What has been considered the main argument for IIA thus turns out to be one
against it. These results show that the traditional intensity argument against it
does not need to rest on the mere intuition that it rules out intensity information.
They illustrate how all of the voting rules studied take intensity information
into account if and when IIA is violated through strategic voting, and this has
bene…cial aggregate-level consequences.
The discussion in this paper focuses on two interrelated topics concerning IIA
and preference intensities. The …rst relates to the fact that Lehtinen’s results,
as well as the intensity arguments against IIA that were presented before Saari’s
contributions, were based on a cardinal notion of preference intensity.3 Saari’s
1See, e.g., McLean (1987, p. 154). Arrow (1983 [1977]a, p. 168) also makes this argument,
and Saari (2001, pp. 45, 137) acknowledges it.
2Saari (1990, 2003b) disagrees with this judgment, however.
3 I mean contributions by Hildreth (1953), Rothenberg (1961, pp. 132-136), Coleman (1966),
Campbell (1973), Ng (1979) and Mackay (1980), for example.
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notion of the intensity level upon which the binary intensity IIA is based is
best characterised as an ordinal notion (Risse 2001, Dowding 2006). Given that
Lehtinen’s results are based on the cardinal notion, what they show is that
cardinal intensities a¤ect the results under all voting rules.
I will show that IIA is also violated in amendment agendas by analysing
an example taken from Lehtinen (2007). This example is used to show that
majority-rule agendas also take preference intensities into account if voters en-
gage in strategic behaviour. It follows that Saari’s arguments concerning the
transitivity of preferences and the intensity level should not be understood as
providing support for the Borda rule and against the majority rule, even though
they are convincing qua arguments against IIA.
Secondly, I will draw on the methodological and philosophical implications
of Lehtinen’s results on strategic voting in my interpretation of Arrow’s theorem
and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Hence I will discuss the methodological
and philosophical arguments concerning preference intensities and IIA.4
The traditional criticisms against preference intensities can be formulated
in terms of three arguments for IIA. The strategic-voting argument states that
strategic voting is to be avoided, and a voting rule that satis…es IIA precludes
strategic voting. The observability argument states that since it is possible
to observe preference orderings, but not preference intensities or interpersonal
comparisons of utilities, allowable information must be restricted to preferences
for pairs of alternatives, and this is what IIA does: ’Modern economic theory
has insisted on the ordinal concept of utility; that is, only orderings can be ob-
served, and therefore no measurement of utility independent of these orderings
has any signi…cance [...] The condition of IIA extends the requirement of observ-
ability one step farther.’(Arrow 1983 [1967], pp. 75-6).5 The epistemological-
moral argument against preference intensities and for IIA states that cardinal
von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities should not be used in social-welfare
judgements because they “re‡ect only individuals’ attitudes towards gambling”
(Arrow 1951, p. 9-11).6 The idea here is that vNM utilities are not appropriate
in this context because they inevitably contain attitudes towards risk.7
I will respond to these arguments as follows. My main argument against
the observability argument is a tu quoque: I will show that ordinal utility is not
observable in voting contexts either. I will thus not attempt to show that prefer-
ence intensities are observable, or that we have particularly precise information
4The question of interpersonal comparisons of preference intensities is not discussed in
this paper. Lehtinen (2007) shows that utilitarian e¢ciencies are higher under strategic than
sincere behaviour for a broad range of di¤erent interpersonal comparisons.
5See also Arrow (1963, p. 110).
6Arrow no longer puts forward this argument in the second edition of Social Choice and
Individual Values (1963). See also Rawls (1971, pp. 172, 323) and Pattanaik (1968).
7Arrow has also justi…ed the IIA condition by referring to its ‘intuitive appeal’ (Arrow
1983[1952], p. 51), arguing that it has ‘strong pragmatic justi…cation’ (Arrow 1983 [1967],
pp. 70, 76), and that it restricts the available information to feasible outcomes (1983[1952],
p. 51, 1983 [1967], p. 76, 1983 [1967], p. 164). The …rst two are not discussed here because
they merely appeal to intuition and thus do not seem to be genuine arguments. The third is
discussed in connection with the observability and strategic-voting arguments.
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on interpersonal comparisons. I will rather establish that observability cannot
be used as an argument for ordinal and against intensities in evaluating voting
rules. The epistemological-moral argument su¤ers from a similar shortcoming:
voting choices re‡ect attitudes towards risk under all voting rules whether we
like it or not. A reasonable voting model should explicitly take this into account
rather than try to avoid the problem by using only ordinal utilities. Further-
more, risk attitudes are not measured in terms of utility functions in Lehtinen’s
models, but are formalised merely in terms of voters’ beliefs.
I will take it for granted that intensities of preference are intrinsically rele-
vant for evaluating voting outcomes normatively. I believe that voting theorists
agree with this judgment8 , and I will thus not attempt to argue for it. This
being the case, rebutting the observability and epistemological-moral arguments
should su¢ce to establish that voting outcomes ought to be evaluated on the
basis of utilitarian criteria. Then, given a utilitarian evaluation of voting out-
comes, strategic voting should be considered an argument against IIA rather
than for it, because strategic voting typically increases utilitarian e¢ciency (or
average utility) as compared to sincere voting under all commonly used voting
rules. The main reason for this is that voters’ behaviour depends on preference
intensities when they vote strategically but not when they vote sincerely: the
utilitarian winner is likely to get more strategic votes than other alternatives.
Information on preference intensities can only be obtained through strategic
voting (cf. Coleman 1966).
2 The observability argument
Social choice theory has been criticised from the outset for ignoring preference
intensities. Dahl (1956, p. 90) provides a typical example of such criticisms:
By making "most preferred" equivalent to "preferred by the most"
we deliberately bypass a crucial problem: What if the minority
prefers its alternative much more passionately than the majority
prefers a contrary alternative? Does the majority principle still make
sense?
Those who have opposed the use of preference intensities and vNM utilities
in social-welfare judgements have based their criticism on epistemological con-
siderations. Here are Arrow’s reasons for not incorporating preference intensities
into social choice theory.
The oldest critique of social choice theory ... is that it disregards
intensity of preference. Even with two alternatives, it would be ar-
gued that a majority with weak preferences should not necessarily
prevail against a minority with strong feelings ... The problem in ac-
cepting this criticism is that of making it operational. Theoretically,
8But see Plott (1976, pp. 541-2).
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is there any meaning to the interpersonal comparison of preference
intensities? Practically, is there any way of measuring them, that is,
is there any form of individual behavior from which the interpersonal
comparisons can be inferred? (Arrow 1977b)
Arrow introduced IIA in order to impose an observational requirement on
social choices. The idea was that the available information has to be restricted
to ordinal utilities because preference orderings are observable but intensity
is not. Indeed, he makes it perfectly clear that cardinal utilities (preference
intensities) would be important for social choice and welfare if we could observe
them directly (Arrow 1987).
Arrow (1973a) argued that ‘In a voting context, the ordinalist-cardinalist
controversy becomes irrelevant, for voting is intrinsically an ordinal comparison
and no more’ (see also Frohlich & Oppenheimer 1999). Strasnick (1976, p. 243)
formulates the di¢culty of observing preference intensity in a voting context as
follows: ‘There is no sense in which the magnitude or degree or intensity of a
choice is observable in the choice itself’.
This, however, does not mean that voters’ choices are una¤ected by pref-
erence intensities. An example in which the outcomes depend on preference
intensities even under a voting rule (the majority rule with an amendment
agenda) in which voters may express a preference directly only for pairs of al-
ternatives is given in section 4. It shows that voting is intrinsically an ordinal
phenomenon only in the sense that voters can merely state whether one alter-
native is better than another in pair-wise contests. However, if voters engage
in strategic behaviour, preference intensities inevitably re‡ect their choices, and
a¤ect the outcomes even under a rule that seemingly collects only ordinal in-
formation. Before discussing this example I will present a rudimentary version
of the Enelow’s (1981) model of strategic voting, and discuss Saari’s arguments
concerning IIA.
3 Does the majority rule lose information on ra-
tionality and preference intensities?
It used to be common to distinguish between di¤erent aspects of the IIA con-
dition.9 The independence (or irrelevance) aspect refers to the fact that the
social ordering (or choice) between any two alternatives must depend only on
individual preferences for those alternatives, and not on individual preferences
for other irrelevant alternatives. The ordering aspect requires that the social
ordering (or choice) of any two alternatives must be based only on individual
orderings of these alternatives and on nothing else. This aspect explicitly rules
out preference intensities.10
9See Sen (1970, p. 89), Mackay (1980, p. 79), and Kemp & Ng (1987).
10 If IIA is formulated in such a way that it refers to cardinal-utility pro…les, we end up with
an impossibility result because cardinal utility without interpersonal comparisons does not
make the impossibility result vanish (Sen 1970, Kalai & Schmeidler 1977). Accordingly, the
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It is generally acknowledged that if relative intensities of preferences are
somehow available then the ordering aspect of IIA need not be accepted, but
the irrelevance aspect has been considered unassailable (Ng 1979, p. 115). How-
ever, it is not quite compelling either because the ‘irrelevant’ alternatives are
not, strictly speaking, irrelevant. IIA does not distinguish between alternatives
that are not even included in the set of available alternatives and those that
belong to that set but do not seem to be under explicit consideration at a given
stage of voting. The truly irrelevant alternatives belong to the former set (cf.
Hansson 1973, Bordes & Tideman 1991). Fortunately, voters’ choices do take
into account preferences for all the alternatives they consider. Even preferences
for alternatives outside the pair for which they are voting at a given stage a¤ect
their decisions if they maximise expected utility, as in Enelow’s (1981) model.
Saari’s claims concerning IIA are perfectly justi…able. What is not so clear is
whether these arguments can be used for defending the BC against the majority
rule used in agenda voting, or any other voting rule for that matter. As Thomas
Risse (2001, 2005) points out, arguments concerning IIA do not settle his dispute
with Saari (2003a, 2006) concerning the BC and the Kemeny rule (see also Saari
& Merlin 2000) because both violate IIA. Given, however, that Saari’s target of
criticism, at least previously (1995), was agenda voting and the majority rule,
what I have to say about agendas may be relevant to this debate as well.
Saari’s IIA criticisms cannot be viewed as arguments for the BC because
IIA also is violated in agenda voting, and the majority rule in agenda voting
takes cardinal as well as ordinal preference intensities into account. In order to
illustrate this, let us consider Enelow’s (1981) model of strategic voting under
amendment agendas.
Let? = f?? ?? ?g denote a set of available alternatives and ? ? voter ?’s utility
function. Table 1 shows the possible preference orderings and a normalisation
convention for voters’ utilities: ?? denotes voter ?’s intensity of preference.
type of voter
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 ? ?
x y z x y z ? ?(¢) = 1
y z x z x y ??(¢) = ??
z x y y z x ? ?(¢) = 0
Table 1: Voter types and utility normalisations with three alternatives
Alternatives are put to a sequence of pair-wise majority comparisons in an
amendment agenda.11 Two alternatives are put to a majority vote against each
other in the …rst round of voting. The winner of this …rst contest is then put
to vote against the third alternative in the second round. Figure 1 presents the
three possible amendment agendas.
standard view is that the most reasonable way to eschew Arrovian impossibility is to make
interpersonal comparisons.
11See Miller (1995) for a discussion on di¤erent agendas.
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      x             y
 x        z   y        z
      x            z
 x        y   z        y
      y            z
 y        x   z       x
                   (A)                                           (B)                                         (C)
Figure 1: Amendment agendas with three alternatives
Voter ?’s subjective probability that a given alternative ? beats another al-
ternative ? (?? ? 2 ?) in a pair-wise second-round contest is denoted ????. In
agenda A, and in the …rst round of voting, voters choose a branch in the vot-
ing tree by comparing expected utilities for lotteries (?? ?;????? 1 ¡ ????) and
(?? ?;????? 1 ¡ ????). Note that merely formulating the voters’ choice situation
under incomplete information shows that they are making a choice not between
the pair f?? ?g, but rather between two lotteries that also involve the third alter-
native ?. It follows immediately that their ‘choice between x and y’ in the …rst
round may provide information concerning their preference intensity between
this pair of alternatives. Expected-utility expressions need to be formulated in
order to show this.
Maximising expected utility implies giving one’s vote to the branch in the
voting tree that has the greatest expected utility. A voter will vote for the
left-hand branch under agenda (A) if
???? ¢ ? ?(?) + (1 ¡ ????) ¢ ? ?(?) ¸ ???? ¢ ? ?(?) + (1 ¡ ????) ¢? ?(?)? (2)
Consider now voter types one and four. Both prefer ? to ?, but the preferences
of type-four voters are ordinally more intensive because they separate the pref-
erences between these alternatives with ? by preferring ? to ? to ?, whereas
type-one voters prefer ? to ? to ?.12 Type-four voters have a dominant strategy
to vote sincerely for ? under agenda A. Applying utility normalisation for a
type-one voter to equation 2 yields:
???? ¢ 1 + (1 ¡ ????) ¢ 0 ¸ ???? ¢ ??1 + (1 ¡ ????) ¢ 0? (3)





When they do, they are e¤ectively expressing a cardinally strong intensity for ?
and ? over ?, and a cardinally weak intensity between ? and ?. Hence, they are
able to express their preference intensity between ? and ? by deciding whether
12 If indi¤erence is ruled out by assuming that 0 ? ?? ? 1 for all voters, this intensity must
also be cardinally stronger.
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to vote strategically or not. In contrast, type-four voters never vote for ? in
the …rst round, and thereby reveal a strong intensity of preference for ? over ?.
Voters thus express their ordinal and cardinal intensities under agenda voting,
but they do this only in a probabilistic sense.
One might be willing to argue that since the BC always collects information
on ordinal intensity, it should be preferred to majority voting under agendas.
However, the normatively important intensity information is cardinal rather
than ordinal. What is thus really relevant is the question of which voting rule
best re‡ects cardinal preference intensities on the aggregate level.13 If the judg-
ment that only aggregate-level cardinal information matters for normative eval-
uations is defensible, it is normatively irrelevant whether it is possible to obtain
information on ordinal intensity from each person separately or not. From this
perspective, trying to replace IIA with a condition like Saari’s binary intensity
IIA, or any condition that fails to take voters’ behaviour explicitly into account,
is not fully satisfactory as a criterion for the choice between various voting rules.
One possible reason why individual-level ordinal intensity information should
be collected is that it is intrinsically related to rationality. It is simultaneously
information concerning the transitivity of preferences. Saari’s rationality argu-
ment against IIA could be formulated as follows. Since IIA restricts the relevant
information to preferences for pairs of alternatives, a voting rule that satis…es
it does not allow for taking into account connecting information between the
di¤erent pairs. Thus, even though one condition for Arrow’s theorem explicitly
requires voters to have transitive preferences, this transitivity is trumped by
IIA.14
Again, Saari’s argument is entirely convincing as a criticism of IIA: if there
were a voting rule that satis…ed IIA, such a rule would lose the information
on voters’ rationality. There are no such rules, however, because voters are
rational when they engage in strategic voting, and they will violate IIA under
all voting rules if they maximise expected utility.15 To put it di¤erently, if
voters are rational, it is not possible to distinguish between di¤erent voting
rules by applying the rationality argument against IIA. Indeed, I presume that
Saari agrees with me here because his point has been that voting rules that
satisfy IIA are incapable of distinguishing the cyclic preferences of (non-existent)
irrational individuals from cyclic preference pro…les. If there is a rationality-
related argument that could distinguish between di¤erent voting rules, it must
concern the recognition of irrational voters from rational ones when not all
voters are rational.
The important case is thus one in which at least some voters are irrational.
It would be best to ignore their votes, but as this will probably be impossible
under all voting rules, the task becomes one of trying to determine how these
13Lehtinen (forthcoming a, b) provides results that are relevant to a comparison between
the BC and agendas. I will not summarise those results here because my main goal is not to
compare particular voting rules.
14 In addition to previous references to Saari, see Saari and Sieberg (2001, 2004).
15Saari agreed in a private conversation (April 2006) that this characterisation of the rela-
tionship between IIA, rationality and strategic voting was apt.
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voters will a¤ect the voting outcomes. One might argue that the BC forces
voters to be rational because it requires them to provide a full ranking of the
alternatives. It might have such edifying aspects, but it is just as plausible
that irrational voters will provide truncated ballots. Nevertheless, there may be
perfectly rational voters, rational in the sense of having transitive preferences,
who also provide truncated ballots. If, for example, a voter prefers ? strongly
to ? and ?, and is not willing to distinguish between the latter two, he or she
may just provide a Borda score for ? and ignore the rest. If and when it is not
possible to distinguish rational from irrational voters in practice, I conclude that
the rationality argument is valid against IIA but cannot be used as an argument
for BC against any other voting rule.
4 IIA is violated in amendment agendas
The Condorcet winner (the alternative that is preferred by a majority to all
other alternatives) is always selected under the majority rule if the voters vote
sincerely (Farquharson 1969) and if they vote strategically under complete in-
formation (McKelvey & Niemi 1978, Moulin 1979). It would thus seem that
the Condorcet winner is observed since it will be the outcome under the ma-
jority rule. I will now use a simple example (from Lehtinen 2007) to show that
this result does not hold under incomplete information (see also Ordeshook &
Palfrey 1988). It follows that IIA is violated even under the majority rule and
an amendment agenda when voters maximise their expected utility.
In fact, the idea that IIA is incompatible with expected utility maximisa-
tion has already been acknowledged by all those who have argued that it does
not allow voters to express their intensities of preference or cardinal utilities
(see in particular Hammond 1991). Assume that the preferences of three voters
?, ?, and ?, can be described as in the following table:
A B C
y (1) y (1) x (1)
x (0.9) x (0.9) z (0.9)
z (0) z (0) y (0)
Table 2: Example 1
The numbers in parentheses denote voters’ utilities. The sum of utility for
the utilitarian winner ? is 0.9+0.9+1=2.8, and for the Condorcet winner ? it
is 1+1+0=2. Thus, ? should be selected according to the utilitarian criterion
instead of the Condorcet winner ?. If all voters vote sincerely, the Condorcet
winner ? will beat the utilitarian winner ? in the …rst round and ? in the second
round, and emerges as the …nal outcome.
Let us now see what would happen if the voters maximise expected utility
under incomplete information. Assume that all three voters have identical beliefs
such that ??? = 0?7, and ??? = 0?9. Voters ? and ? are of type …ve. They will
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vote strategically for ? in the …rst round because ?5 ?
???
???
(0?9 ? 0?70?9 = 0?7778).
Voter ? has a weakly dominant strategy to vote for ? in the …rst round of
voting. Thus, ? is the outcome if the voters maximise expected utility because
it beats ? in the …rst round and ? in the second round. The utilitarian winner ?
is chosen if they maximise expected utility but the Condorcet winner ? is chosen
if they vote sincerely. A Condorcet winner is thus not necessarily chosen under
the majority rule.16
Let us now proceed to show that IIA is violated in this example. Whether
it is de…ned in terms of pairs of alternatives or in terms of a set of relevant
alternatives17 is not particularly important here, as long as it is formulated in
choice-functional terms and the social choice function refers to actually chosen
alternatives. Let us thus assume that ?(?) denotes a choice made by society
in voting from a set of alternatives ? ½ ?. Arrow’s (1963) treatment assumes
that all voters vote sincerely so that each one chooses the alternative that he
or she prefers the most. Let ??(?) denote individual i’s choice from a set of
alternatives ?? and Â?his or her preference ordering, and let ?(? Â ?) denote
the number of voters who prefer alternative ? to ?. Arrow requires that the
individual choices ful…l equation (4):18
??(?) = f?j? 2 ? : 8? 2 ? : ? Â? ?g? (4)
The method of majority decision is de…ned by
8?? ? 2 ? : ?(?) = ?$ 8? 2 ? : ?(? Â ?) ? ?(? Á ?)? (5)
A Condorcet winner (CW) is de…ned by
?? = f?j? 2 ? : 8? 2 ? : ?(? Â ?) ? ?(? Á ?)g? (6)
A Condorcet winner is always chosen in the method of majority decision because
(4) guarantees that the social choice according to (5) always selects it.
Consider now example 1. It is easy to see that IIA is violated: ? was chosen
when all voters voted sincerely, but ? was chosen if some voted strategically.
Two di¤erent outcomes emerged from a single preference pro…le from the two
di¤erent behavioural assumptions. It is also possible, of course, to obtain two
di¤erent outcomes from a single pro…le and only the behavioural assumption of
expected utility maximisation if the voters’ beliefs are di¤erent in two di¤erent
cases.
The example is of importance for three reasons. First, it shows that attitudes
towards risk and preference intensities will inevitably a¤ect voting choices if
voters maximise expected utility under incomplete information. Secondly, IIA
is violated even under the majority rule if voters maximise expected utility and
16 If satisfying IIA is desirable, selecting a Condorcet winner is desirable because ‘IIA implies
the Condorcet criterion’ (Arrow 1997, p. 5). An argument against the plausibility of IIA is
thus simultaneously an argument against the normative appeal of Condorcet winners.
17See Ray (1973), Sen (1986), and Bordes & Tideman (1991).
18The assumption that all preferences are strict is used here.
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if there are at least three alternatives. It is well known that many commonly
used voting rules (plurality, runo¤, Borda, etc.) may fail to select a Condorcet
winner. This means that insofar as Arrow’s theorem is considered a theorem
about voting rules, the IIA condition is violated under all democratic voting
rules that consider at least three alternatives (cf. Hansson 1973).
Finally, ordinal utility is not observable either in the sense that the se-
lected alternative need not be the Condorcet winner under the majority rule
and amendment agendas. The sum-of-utility criterion has been criticised for
not being observable (e.g., Arrow 1973b). Preference orderings would be ob-
servable if the Condorcet winners were always selected under the majority rule,
but this is not the case. The possibility of strategic voting thus undermines
the observability argument. Therefore, preference orderings are not observable
either, and observability is not a valid argument for ordinal utility and against
intensities in a voting context. The claim that preference orderings are scientif-
ically respectable because they can be observed is an invalid argument against
intensities in voting theory even though this argument may have some weight
in other contexts.
It would, of course, be easier to collect information on preference orderings
than on intensities by other means than voting. We could, for example, simply
ask the voters about their preference orderings. The problem with any proce-
dure other than voting itself, however, is that insofar as the results are used
for making decisions, the individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their
preferences. If, on the other hand, the results are not used for making deci-
sions, voters, particularly representatives in parliaments, have an incentive to
misrepresent their preferences in order to give signals to their constituencies.
Collecting information on preference orderings is thus easier than collecting in-
formation on preference intensities, but it is ultimately not possible to obtain
fully reliable information on either of them.
It is not possible to prove the general claim that intensities will a¤ect the re-
sults under all voting rules here. However, it is clear that insofar as an expected-
utility model can be formulated for any voting rule, it can be shown that pref-
erence intensities will a¤ect the outcomes under this rule. What follows from
this is that if the epistemological-moral argument is to be e¤ective against us-
ing intensities in voting theory, one has to deny that voting is characterised
by decision-making under uncertainty. Surely, however, nobody is willing to
argue that voters have complete information on other voters’ preferences in an
electorate of dozens, thousands or millions. Real-world voting is clearly charac-
terised by decision-making under uncertainty, as Coleman (1966) argued long
ago.
Some authors would perhaps be willing to argue that one reason why strategy-
proofness is to be imposed is that the possibility of strategic voting makes it
impossible to check the legitimacy and/or paradoxical nature of voting out-
comes.19 Indeed, Kelly (1988, p. 103) provides a list of explicit arguments upon
which intuitive judgments rely, and which is applicable to the strategy-proofness
19See e.g., Riker (1982), and for counterarguments see Mackie (2003).
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condition.20
1. Manipulation introduces an element of randomness into collective deci-
sions.
2. Unequal manipulative skills may lead to the destruction of our e¤orts to
design rules with an equal treatment of individuals.
3. Voters are led to waste resources in manipulation calculations.
4. We are led to try to reduce manipulation by others of us by concealing our
preferences, thus reducing the ‡ow of information that might help in collective
decision-making.
5. Manipulation by representatives blurs their voting record and makes it
di¢cult for us to determine if they are really representing our interests.
None of these arguments refers to how well individual preferences are satis…ed
when people vote strategically rather than sincerely. The arguments are not
welfarist. It is clear that points 2, 3, 4 and 5 are more relevant to the voting
behaviour of parliamentary representatives than to citizens’ voting behaviour
in mass elections. Therefore, in order to evaluate whether strategic voting is
bene…cial or harmful in parliaments or courts, we need some further knowledge
about the relevance of the …ve arguments compared to a utilitarian evaluation
of its consequences. In the case of mass elections, none of the arguments seems
to be compelling. An increasing number of scholars have stated that they do
not consider strategic voting morally questionable.21 This may signal the fact
that Satterthwaite’s arguments are no longer fully accepted.
Rather than taking these arguments as straightforward criticisms of strategic
voting, I propose that they should be turned into open research questions. With
the exception of the …fth one, it is possible to study them in a welfarist and
empirical way (see e.g., Lehtinen’s papers).
5 The epistemological-moral argument
Since I am arguing for a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes in voting theory, it
would seem natural to take Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955, 1977) theorems as a decision-
theoretic justi…cation for a utilitarian position. Harsanyi claims that the theo-
rems show that von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities represent preference
intensities, and that they can be used to provide an argument for utilitarian-
ism. I do not draw on these theorems because I fully accept the criticism that
Harsanyi’s utilitarianism is ‘utilitarianism in name only’22: the theorems do not
really provide an argument for utilitarianism.
Arrow and Rawls …rst presented what I call the epistemological-moral ar-
gument as a criticism of Harsanyi’s position. According to the argument, vNM
20These arguments were originally presented in Mark Satterthwaite’s PhD dissertation: The
Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure (University of Wisconsin, 1973). See Van Hees
& Dowding (forthcoming) for a comprehensive discussion.
21See Kolm (1996), Buchanan & Yoon (2006), and for a more full-blown argument Van Hees
& Dowding (forthcoming).
22See Sen (1976, 1977, 1986), Weymark (1991), Roemer (1996, pp. 138-150), and Mongin
(2001).
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utilities should not be used in social-welfare judgements because they inevitably
contain morally irrelevant information on attitudes towards risk. The moral
part is that attitudes towards risk are irrelevant to social-welfare judgments and
they should therefore not be taken into account, and the epistemological part is
that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions can only be constructed from
choices involving risk.23 Hence, attitudes towards risk inevitably a¤ect social-
welfare judgements if these judgements are based on von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities.
Harsanyi has persistently argued that vNM utility functions may be used
for social-welfare judgements: they functions express a willingness to take risks
in order to obtain some particular alternative (Harsanyi 1987). Hence, they
express the relative intensity with which a person prefers one alternative to
another (see also Harsanyi 1978, 1979, and Ng 1999).
Harsanyi (1992, pp. 682-684) argues that Arrow and Rawls confuse ‘process
utility’ and ‘outcome utility’ (see also Harsanyi 1993). Process utility, or ’util-
ity from gambling’, refers to the enjoyment from playing a game that involves
risk, while outcome utility relates to the prizes one may obtain. Harsanyi is
right in that the reduction of the compound-lotteries axiom precludes process
utilities and thereby ‘utility from gambling’. The vNM theory thus rules out at-
titudes towards enjoyment from gambling by assumption. Harsanyi is also right
in pointing out that outcome utilities are ethically important. His arguments
could be taken to account for why we think preference intensities are morally
relevant. The problem with his argument about process utility and outcome
utility is that it does not really provide a response to the criticism: attitudes
towards process utilities are not what a carefully stated epistemological-moral
argument should be all about. Arrow (1983 [1973]c, p. 107), for example, ar-
gues that vNM utilities incorporate attitudes towards risk. The epistemological-
moral argument also concerns attitudes towards risk that are related to voters’
willingness to engage in strategic behaviour, not just attitudes towards enjoy-
ment from gambling, and these attitudes are also irrelevant to social-welfare
judgements.24
Arrow and Rawls’ position is buttressed by a well-known decision-theoretical
epistemological consideration: standard expected utility theory does not provide
any way of distinguishing between the psychological sensations of diminishing
marginal utility (or diminishing intensity of satisfaction) and risk aversion, if
all we are given are a person’s choices under uncertainty. Indeed, Harsanyi
(1992, p. 685) admits this. Choices under risk do re‡ect preference intensities,
just as he claims, but this argument does not change the fact that attitudes
towards risk also a¤ect these choices. Hence, while vNM utilities incorporate
ethically relevant information concerning preference intensities, they also incor-
porate ethically irrelevant information concerning attitudes towards risk.
Harsanyi has successfully shown that choices under uncertainty re‡ect pref-
erence intensities, and that these intensities are morally relevant. Neverthe-
23See e.g., Alchian (1953), Baumol (1958), or Fishburn (1989).
24Here I am disregarding the entirely di¤erent question of whether the riskiness of the choice
alternatives in an election should be taken into account.
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less, the epistemological-moral argument remains valid because vNM utilities
inevitably re‡ect morally irrelevant attitudes towards risk. However, this ar-
gument can be used against using preference intensities in social choice theory
only if it is possible to collect reliable information on ordinal utilities that do
not re‡ect attitudes towards risk. As shown in the previous section, this is not
possible.
6 Conclusions
Social choice theorists have not been willing to abandon IIA mainly because
it is closely related to excluding strategic voting. However, strategic voting is
desirable rather than undesirable under most commonly used voting rules. The
basic reason for this is that it re‡ects preference intensities, and sincere voting
does not allow for this under most voting rules. This is why strategic voting
should be taken as an argument against IIA rather than for it. By the same
token, the strategy-proofness condition is also normatively questionable.
Arrow’s impossibility result and the closely related theorems given by Gib-
bard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) are unassailable as deductive proofs. How-
ever, we should not be concerned about these results because their most crucial
conditions are not justi…able. Fortunately, IIA and strategy-proofness are vio-
lated under all democratic voting rules, including the majority rule in agenda
voting. Given that Arrow’s theorem crucially depends on IIA, its importance is
called into question. Saari (1995, p. 196) once formulated the meaning of the
Arrow theorem as follows: it asserts that the ignored information is vital and
that it is impossible to construct a procedure that systematically discards infor-
mation on preference intensities. But why should anyone want such procedures
in the …rst place?
None of the arguments discussed in this paper, the epistemological-moral, the
observability, and the strategic-voting argument, is successful as an argument
for using only preference orderings and Condorcet winners in voting theory.
There seems to be no good reason for evaluating voting outcomes on the basis
of Condorcet winners rather than utilitarian winners. Utilitarian winners are to
be preferred on genuine ethical grounds, however, because they take preference
intensities into account.
The above arguments thus give rise to three methodological conclusions.
First, given that the three main arguments for IIA and against intensities fail,
there is no reason to favour Condorcet winners over utilitarian winners in wel-
farist evaluations of voting rules. Secondly, the notion of cyclic preferences and
the absence of a Condorcet winner have been given an all too prevalent role in
voting theory. The possibility that the preferences are cyclic is only one among
many factors that may in‡uence voting outcomes. Beliefs, information and
preference intensities are also important. Models that take into account only
preference orderings provide a misleading picture of voting rules because such
models are based on the false empirical assumption that voting is characterised
by choice under certainty.
14
The third methodological conclusion is that the theory of strategic voting has
not addressed the right questions. If strategic voting is bene…cial under many
commonly used voting rules, it does not seem very fruitful to seek strategy-
proof voting mechanisms or to …nd out which voting rules are least susceptible
to strategic voting. The relevant question concerns how much strategic vot-
ing increases (or perhaps decreases) utilitarian e¢ciency under various voting
rules under di¤erent assumptions on the voters’ willingness to take risks, prefer-
ence intensities and interpersonal comparisons. There are signi…cant di¤erences
between di¤erent voting rules in these respects.
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